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Abstract 
Firms’ willingness to provide and pay for general training crucially depends on whether they are able 
to recoup their training costs. A successful strategy is to retain the most productive training graduates. 
This paper investigates whether training firms use performance pay as a successful retention 
mechanism. Economic theory predicts that inherently more productive workers self-select into 
performance pay jobs because of higher expected returns. Using representative data from a large 
employer-employee survey, we test whether a similar relationship exists in the training context. 
Performing panel IV estimation, we find that both the magnitude and the likelihood of performance 
pay have a significantly positive effect on a firm’s retention of training graduates. 
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1. Introduction 
Declining labor market prospects for young people have renewed interest in firms’ 
investments in training of labor market entrants. Recent evidence suggests that a dual training 
system, combining formal education at a vocational school with on-the-job training, 
smoothens youths’ entry into the labor market (Bell & Blanchflower 2010; Scarpetta et 
al. 2010). However, the greatest challenge to the introduction of a dual training system is 
firms’ refusal to bear the training costs (Harhoff & Kane 1997). The market problem for firms 
in this context is uncertainty about graduates’ post-training behavior, which affects their 
ability of recouping the investment costs. Therefore, a firm’s willingness to offer and finance 
training crucially depends on its ability to retain graduates. 
Acemoglu & Pischke (1998) have introduced a theoretical model, which explains a firm’s 
incentive to offer general training through the existence of imperfect labor markets. The main 
assumption of this model is that frictions in the labor market provide training firms with a 
certain market power that prevents the firms’ graduates from switching employers without 
losing income. In recent years, a large number of studies has identified different sources of 
labor market frictions and tested their impact on a firm’s willingness to offer and finance 
training 1  (Acemoglu & Pischke 1998; 1999a; Booth & Bryan 2007; Dustmann & 
Schoenberg 2007; 2009; Katz & Ziderman 1999; Mohrenweiser & Backes-Gellner 2010; 
Stevens 1994a; 1994b). To date, surprisingly little discussion exists on whether factors other 
than imperfect markets might exist that enable training firms to retain their graduates. In this 
paper, we fill this gap by exploring a potential solution that firms create internally and that 
does not rely on external market conditions.  
The retention of workers is a widely studied topic in personnel economics. Here, however, the 
focus lies on the firm and less so on the market environment. In particular, personnel 
economics has focused on a firm’s compensation structure as a means to hire and retain 
workers. Starting with Lazear (1986), a growing body of evidence has shown that 
performance pay, defined as pay tied to worker output, has two effects. First, the incentive 
effect causes performance pay workers to increase their effort. Second, the sorting effect 
causes more able workers to select and stay in performance pay jobs, while less able workers 
stay away from or leave performance pay jobs (see e.g., Dohmen & Falk 2011; Gielen et al. 
2009; Lazear 2000; 2004). In equilibrium, workers have reallocated according to their ability 
so that productivity and wages in performance pay firms are higher.  
We apply these findings from personnel economics to the theory of training and investigate 
the effects of performance pay on the retention of apprenticeship graduates. We develop a 
simple contracting framework that provides a rationale for this firm policy. Specifically, we 
argue that for the most productive graduates the reasons to stay with their training firms are 
twofold: First, they expect a higher compensation because performance pay rewards their 
individual productivity. However, since this would also be the case in non-training firms that 
offer performance pay, there has to be another productivity advantage that incentivizes 
graduates to stay. The second reason is that they expect to gain from positive externalities 
from training, which of course do not exist in non-training firms. Recent studies show that 
training firms are on average more productive than non-training firms. The higher 
productivity can be explained through training firms’ success of attracting and retaining a 
more productive workforce through better signaling and screening mechanisms (Autor 2001; 
Cappelli 2004; Tuor & Backes-Gellner 2010).  
If training firms offer performance pay and the most productive graduates have an incentive 
to stay, then the overall productivity level is boosted even more, i.e., high quality training 
creates a self-reinforcing productivity advantage. Therefore, the most productive graduates 
should reach their highest productivity level with the current training firm, implying that 
expected earnings are also highest with the current training firm. In turn, training firms that 
use performance pay should be more successful in retaining their training graduates than 
training firms not using it. Going further, one could argue that these performance pay firms 
should also be more likely to invest in training, because they have better chances of realizing 
a return on their investment. 
Our empirical analysis focuses on Switzerland, which provides the most suitable context for 
our investigation. First, Switzerland has a large institutionalized dual vocational education 
and training (VET) system, where training is mostly in general skills, and largely financed by 
training firms (Wolter & Strupler Leiser 2012). Second, compared to other countries with a 
strong VET tradition like Germany, the Swiss labor market is much less regulated 
(Muehlemann et al. 2010; Ryan et al. 2013). Therefore, Swiss firms may be less able to rely 
on market frictions and instead need to find another way of retaining their training graduates. 
For the analysis, we use the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey (SESS), a large employer-
employee survey. Even though the survey is designed as a cross-section, we are able to 
identify most firms in subsequent points of time and are therefore able to construct a firm 
panel. The main advantage of this data is that it contains separate information about the base 
and the bonus payments of individual workers, enabling us to investigate the effect of both the 
incidence and the magnitude of performance pay. We develop two measures for the use of 
performance pay in a firm, one reflecting the intensity, i.e., the amount of performance pay in 
relation to the total pay in a firm, and the other reflecting the coverage rate, i.e., the share of 
workers receiving performance pay.  
To establish a causal link between a firm’s use of performance pay and its ability to retain 
their training graduates, we perform IV estimations. We instrument the performance pay 
measures with a variable measuring the occupational position of single workers, arguing that 
the position should be correlated with performance pay but should not have any effect on the 
retention of graduates. We find that training firms with pay-for-performance plans have a 
significantly higher retention of training graduates than training firms with fixed salaries. 
Both the performance pay intensity and the coverage rate have a significantly positive effect 
on the retention of training graduates. Ultimately, our results might indicate that performance 
pay firms are more likely to invest in training, as they can more successfully retain their 
graduates.  
This paper contributes to the new training literature by providing an additional answer to the 
question of why firms would provide and pay for investment in general training. We argue 
and provide evidence that imperfect labor markets might not be the sole condition for the 
existence of firm-provided general training. Instead, our findings show that training firms in 
weakly regulated labor markets might resort to different payment strategies to incentivize 
their graduates to stay. This finding should be of high interest to policy makers who are 
considering the introduction of a Germanic-style dual VET system as a means to tackle youth 
unemployment. Policy discussions should not exclusively focus on market regulations, but 
also account for the firm itself and potentially successful firm strategies. 
  
2. Theoretical Background 
In this section, we first give a short overview of the new training literature and the 
performance pay literature. We then introduce a simple two-period retention model similar in 
spirit to Lazear (1986). Because this model does not make any assumptions concerning 
markets and institutions, its validity is not limited to the Swiss case. Rather, similar to 
Lazear’s performance pay model, our retention model has general appeal.  
2.1 Related Literature 
The standard theory of training draws a crucial distinction between general and specific 
training (Becker 1962). While general training increases workers’ productivity in many firms, 
specific training increases their productivity only in the firm providing the training. Under the 
assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets, general training is solely beneficial to the 
worker, because it directly translates into higher wages. Therefore, Becker (1962) predicts 
that firms will never pay for general training.  
The empirical evidence is, however, difficult to reconcile with this model. In many countries 
with a dual VET system, firms provide and pay for training that is largely general (von 
Bardeleben et al. 1995; Beicht et al. 2004; Jansen et al. 2015; Schweri et al. 2003). The new 
training literature relaxes the assumption of perfect markets and argues that market 
imperfections provide training firms with a certain market power that prevents their graduates 
from switching employers without losing income.  
A large number of studies has identified different sources of market frictions: Some 
contributions point out that regulations such as employment protection and institutions such 
as unions increase a firm’s ability to retain a sufficiently high number of graduates 
(Acemoglu & Pischke 1999b; Dustmann & Schoenberg 2007; 2009; Jansen et al. 2012). 
Other studies focus on mobility costs and low labor turnover rates caused by residential 
inertia (Harhoff & Kane 1997; Stevens 1994a), on information asymmetries 
(Acemoglu & Pischke 1998; Katz & Ziderman 1999), on reputation aspects and social 
expectations (Harhoff & Kane 1997; Sadowski 1980), and on complementarities between 
general and firm-specific training (Franz & Soskice 1994).  
Although they may well affect investment in human capital, the new training literature does 
generally not discuss the role of payment methods. On the other hand, personnel economics 
has traditionally focused on a firm’s compensation structure as a means to hire and retain 
workers. Starting with Lazear (1986), a growing body of evidence has shown that 
performance pay, defined as pay tied to worker output, has two effects. First, the incentive 
effect causes performance pay workers to work harder. Second, the sorting effect causes more 
able workers to select and stay with performance pay firms, while less able workers leave 
performance pay firms.  
In equilibrium, workers have reallocated according to their ability so that productivity and 
wages in performance pay firms are higher than in fixed salary firms (Dohmen & Falk 2011; 
Gielen et al. 2009; Lazear 2000; 2004). Thus, one stylized fact that emerges from these 
studies is that performance pay induces workers’ selection into the right jobs. In the next 
section, we sketch a simple model on how this selection process might work for workers 
graduating from vocational education and training. 
2.2 Retention Model  
The following two-period model applies the same basic assumptions as in Lazear (1986): 
Firms and workers are risk-neutral and form a principal-agent relationship. Firms maximize 
expected profit and workers maximize expected utility. Firms can choose between two 
compensation strategies. They either pay a salary !! ! !, where !!  equals the wage the 
worker receives in period t and is a fixed amount, or they pay !! ! ! !! , where !! is the 
output the individual worker produces in period t. There is no discounting between periods. 
For simplicity, in our model, we assume that firms do not incur monitoring costs.2 
The structure of the model is as follows. In period one, the firm hires apprentices and starts 
training them. We assume that apprentices are randomly assigned to training firms such that 
each firm has a group of apprentices that are similar in their ability distribution. This is a 
reasonable assumption given that we know from previous research that apprentices’ initial 
choice of training firm is random (Oswald & Backes-Gellner 2014). We also assume that 
firms train more apprentices than they have vacancies to fill. Indeed, the average retention 
rate is 36 percent in Switzerland (Schweri et al. 2003). 
In period two, firms offer employment contracts to their graduates and the graduates have to 
decide whether to stay with their training firm or to choose a different employer. Graduates 
accept the employment offer if the expected compensation at their training firm is larger than 
their outside options. To sketch these options, we have to take into account two firm 
characteristics, training firms and non-training firms as well as salary firms and performance 
pay firms. Figure 1 illustrates the types of firms we are considering.  
 
Figure 1. Relative wages and productivity between firms 
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First, we discuss the differences in expected compensation at training firms and non-training 
firms. As we have pointed out previously, training firms are on average more productive than 
non-training firms (Autor 2001; Backes-Gellner & Tuor 2010; Cappelli 2004). Since more 
productive firms pay higher wages (Abowd et al. 1999), accepting the employment offer will 
always lead to a higher utility level than renouncing it and starting to work at a non-training 
firm. Thus, graduates should always prefer working at a training firm to working at a non-
training firm. In line with our prediction, Mohrenweiser (2013) shows empirically for 
Germany that almost all inter-firm movement of training graduates takes place between 
training firms. Non-training firms hardly participate in the post-graduation recruitment 
market. 
Second, we discuss the differences in expected compensation at training firms with 
performance pay and at training firms with fixed salaries. In this case, we assume that the 
graduates react in the same way as the incumbent workers in Lazear’s (1986) model and 
derive the following sorting result: Graduates with ! !! ! ! choose to work at a performance 
pay firm, while those with ! !! ! ! choose firms with the fixed salary !. Therefore, for the 
most productive graduates, accepting the offer from a training firm with performance pay will 
always yield a higher utility than leaving and starting to work at a training firm with fixed 
salaries. Again, the most productive graduates expect to receive a higher wage with a 
performance pay firms because the graduates’ higher productivity will be observed and 
rewarded in this type of firms.  
In our model, the only option yielding the same utility is an offer from a training firm with 
performance pay. However, because each firm trains more apprentices than it wishes to 
recruit, these firms already have a sufficiently high number of graduates they want to retain 
and do not have any incentives to hire graduates from external firms, engaging in potentially 
costly poaching activities. 
In equilibrium, these training firms with performance pay should be able to retain the most 
productive graduates. Given that all training firms’ interests are to hire the most productive 
graduates only, we should observe that training firms with performance pay retain more 
graduates than training firms with fixed salaries, because they offer the most attractive 
compensation for these graduates.  
In the empirical investigation of our hypothesis we will thus compare training firms with 
performance pay and training firms with fixed salaries and expect to find that performance 
pay firms have a higher share of graduates than fixed salary firms. Before proceeding to the 
empirical analysis, we introduce the data and provide a short overview of the Swiss dual 
vocational education and training system. Understanding the main features of this system is 
crucial for interpreting the empirical results of this paper. 
 
3. Institutional Background and Data 
In this section we first overview our main data, the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey. Second, 
we explain how we construct our dependent and the independent variables. To better 
understand our measurements, we also provide some key information about the Swiss VET 
system. Third, we present our sample and descriptive statistics.  
3.1 The Swiss Earnings Structure Survey 
For our empirical analysis, we use the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey (SESS), an employer-
employee survey that is conducted every two years by the Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office (SFSO). The SFSO ensures representativeness of the sample by randomly drawing 
firms from the Swiss central register of firms within groups based on size, geographical 
location, and industry. Participation in the survey is compulsory. Firms with fewer than 20 
employees must report on their entire workforce, firms with fewer than 50 employees on at 
least half of their workforce, and firms with more than 50 employees, on at least one third of 
their workforce. Firms not reporting their entire workforce randomly select the employees for 
whom they provide data.3 
The SESS is particularly suitable for our analysis for three main reasons. First, the SESS is 
the only Swiss dataset that contains separate information about the base and the bonus pay of 
individual employees, enabling us to investigate the effect of both the incidence and the 
magnitude of performance pay.4 Second, the SESS is an establishment survey, i.e., personnel 
officers fill out the questionnaire. Since the data come from establishment records they are not 
subject to recall error and clustering at round figures typically observed in earnings data 
(Zweimueller 1992). Third, the sampling has two levels, firms and individual workers. We 
have firm-level information such as firm size, industry and location, as well as detailed 
information about individual worker characteristics. To conduct the panel study on the firm 
level, we aggregate the individual worker data to the firm level and generate a firm panel that 
allows us to control for time-specific and firm-specific effects. In the analysis, we use the 
waves from 1998 through 2004. Even though later waves of the SESS are available, we can 
only use the data until 2004. Unfortunately, from 2006 onwards the firm identifier has 
changed so that we cannot match firms over time anymore.  
3.2 Measurements 
Training Graduates 
Our dependent variable is the rate of internal training graduates, relating the number of 
graduates that received their training with their current firm to the total number of workers 
with a vocational education and training degree in the firm. The graduates in our sample have 
taken part in a dual vocational education and training (VET) program. Apprentices who attend 
such training spend between one to two days per week in a public vocational school and three 
to four days at the training firm where they receive on-the-job training and take actively part 
in the firm’s production process. Apprentices typically start their training after compulsory 
schooling, when they are on average 17 years old.5 
The two main types of training last either three or four years. Therefore, graduates are 
between 20 and 21 years old at the end of their training. The apprentices graduate after 
passing both a practical and a theoretical examination. They receive a federal certificate that 
is recognized throughout Switzerland. Because their skills are externally assessed, graduates 
have a qualification that is portable and the opportunity to move to different employers. The 
employment relationship ends automatically upon the completion of training and any 
extension must be negotiated in a new contract.  
To identify those workers who have recently graduated at the firm where they are currently 
employed, we use three pieces of information, namely a worker’s education, age and tenure. 
The SESS records tenure in a firm starting from the very first day of the VET program. 
Therefore, any worker (i) with a VET degree, (ii) who is not older than 21 and (iii) who has 
been working at the same firm for at least three years, has probably received his training with 
his current firm. Formally, we apply the following equation for each person i with a VET 
degree:  
 !"#! ! !"#$%"! !! !"!!! !! !"# ! !" (1) 
 
We construct a dummy with the value one for those workers who fulfill these criteria and call 
it the “internal training graduates dummy.” Because this dummy does not capture the 
30 percent of workers who were 18 years and older when they started their training, we argue 
that it is a conservative measure, capturing the lower bound of internal training graduates.6 
For the sake of inference we decide to use this lower bound. In a robustness check reported in 
the Appendix of this paper, we modify equation (1) and use a different bound. This 
modification does not change our results 
In the next step, to construct the within-firm rate, we add up the internal training graduates 
dummy within a firm and divide it by the number of workers with a VET degree 
(“VET workers”) in that firm. Because the SESS contains only information on core workers 
but not on apprentices, we cannot relate the number of graduates who stay to the overall 
number of former apprentices within a firm, which would give us the more commonly used 
retention rate. We use the number of VET workers instead, which should be a good indicator 
for the number of apprentices i.e., graduates within a firm. While this ratio is not a “true” 
retention rate, it approximates it in the best possible way. We call this ratio the rate of internal 
training graduates. A thorough inspection of the data shows that throughout the observation 
period the fluctuations in firm size and number of VET workers are very low and, more 
importantly, they move in parallel. 
 
 
 
Performance Pay 
Our main explanatory variables are the performance pay intensity and the performance pay 
coverage. The SESS has the unique feature that it provides separate information on the base 
and bonus components of workers’ earnings.7 This characteristic enables us to investigate the 
effect of both the incidence and the magnitude of performance pay. Since we are interested in 
firm level outcomes, we aggregate the individual information to the firm level.  
To measure the magnitude, we add up the individual performance pay amounts that 
VET workers receive within a firm. To generate a performance pay rate, we relate this 
aggregated amount of performance pay to the aggregated monthly wage of VET workers. We 
call this measure “performance pay intensity,” because it shows the percentage of total pay 
that is based on performance. Formally, we define the performance pay intensity of a firm j 
as: 
 !! ! !"#$"%!#&!" ! !"#$!!"!!"#$%#&'()"!!"#!!"!!"#! "#$%#!!!!!"!!"#$!!!!!! !"#$!!"!!"#$$! "#$!!!!! !"!!"#! "#$%#!!!!"!!"#$!! !!!  (2) 
 
For a second measure, we construct a dummy variable indicating whether a worker has 
received bonus payments. Again, because we are interested in firm level outcomes, we add up 
the dummy variable to see how many VET workers receive performance pay within a firm. 
We divide this number by the total number of VET workers to construct a measure for the 
share of workers receiving performance pay within each firm. We call this measure 
“performance pay coverage,” because it reflects the percentage of workers within a firm 
receiving performance pay. Formally, we define performance pay coverage of a firm j as:  
 !! ! !"#$%&'$!" ! !!"#! "#$%#!!!!"#"$%$&'!!"#$%#&'()"!!"#!!"!!"#$!!!!!!! !"#! "#$%#!!!!"!!!"#!!!!!!!   (3) 
 
Controls  
In addition to the above earnings data, the SESS contains a rich set of worker-level control 
variables. For each firm and year we use the following control variables: monthly gross wages 
(fixed salary without bonus payments), age and age squared (in years), tenure and tenure 
squared (in years), occupational tasks (categorical), job requirements (categorical), gender 
(dummy), and nationality (dummy). We aggregate these individual level variables to the firm 
level and compute the mean of these variables at the firm level. Importantly, we do not 
exclude workers by educational degree when aggregating our control variables. We also 
control for firm size (continuous), industry, geographical location, and year (all dummies). 
3.3 Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
We restrict our sample as follows: We exclude firms in the public sector, because they usually 
do not behave in a profit-maximizing way, which can have consequences for their training 
and retention decision (Muehlemann et al. 2007). We also exclude some firms that appear to 
be switching industries due to inconsistencies in the data. In addition, we drop firms in the 
agricultural sector because the observations in our sample are not representative.  
In line with previous literature, we exclude firms with fewer than five employees, because 
their expansion potential through hiring new graduates is very limited (Muehlemann et 
al. 2007). We also exclude part-time workers. Finally, since we want to explore the effect of 
performance pay on the retention of graduates, we compare training firms offering 
performance pay with training firms offering fixed salaries. In line with (Mohrenweiser & 
Backes-Gellner 2010), we define a training firm following an investment strategy as a firm 
that has retained at least one graduate during the observation period.  
After creating the panel and removing missing variables, we are left with a sample of 
16,643 observations. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the aggregated variables, i.e., 
all variables are firm-level averages. The dependent variable, the rate of internal training 
graduates is 0.44 percent, a clear indication that our measure is a lower bound of the real rate. 
Out of 1,000 VET workers in a firm, almost five are young internal training graduates. With 
regards to our main explanatory variables, about 10 percent of monthly average gross wages 
(about 630 Swiss Francs) are performance pay earnings. The amount of performance pay 
varies greatly within and between firms with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 
94 percent. On average, 10 percent of VET workers receive performance pay.  
The average worker earns a monthly gross wage of 6,270 Swiss Francs, is 41 years old and 
has 10 years of tenure. Sixty percent of the workforce is Swiss and 75 percent is male. The 
very high percentage of male workers is due to the exclusion of part-time workers. The 
variable “occupational tasks” describes 24 different kinds of tasks that the worker is 
performing on the job. Examples are administrative tasks, accounting, or logistics. The 
variable “job requirements” has four categories and describes how demanding a job is. 
Category 1 comprises repetitive tasks, category 2 comprises tasks where some expert 
knowledge is needed, category 3 comprises autonomous tasks, and category 4 describes tasks 
with the highest level of expert knowledge. The variable “occupational position” has five 
categories that rank jobs from 1 (positions without any management function) to 5 (the 
highest management position). Given that we use firm-level averages for our calculations, we 
include these categorical variables as continuous variables in our regression. 
Among the firm characteristics, firm size is a continuous variable and varies between five and 
32,000 employees. Industry is coded according to the 2-digit NOGA 08, which corresponds to 
the European classification of economic activities, NACE. The region distinguishes between 
the seven Greater Regions in Switzerland.  
 
{Table 1 here} 
 
4. Empirical approach 
In this section, we first explain how we identify the causal effect of performance pay on the 
retention of internal training graduates. Because of a potential endogeneity bias, we 
instrument our performance pay measures with a variable measuring occupational position. 
The rationale of the IV strategy is that the occupational position should be correlated with 
both the amount of performance pay and the likelihood of receiving it. It should, however, be 
uncorrelated with the retention of internal training graduates. Second, we present our 
estimation approach where we move from pooled OLS to firm fixed effects and finally to 
panel IV estimations.  
4.1 Identification Strategy 
Our model predicts that performance pay has a positive impact on a firm’s ability to retain its 
most productive graduates. A convincing analysis of the causal link between performance pay 
and the retention rate requires an exogenous source of variation in performance payments. It 
is conceivable that exogenous demand shocks might influence both a firm’s payment and 
retention strategy. Positive demand shocks induce an upward bias if they cause firms to 
increase their recruitment and retention of apprentices to cope with increased needs for skilled 
labor and, simultaneously, cause firms to increase their performance payments due to 
increased profits. In contrast, low performance payments might be a signal for labor costs 
problems that the firm might try to solve by a hiring stop.  
A consistent estimate of the true effect can be obtained if there is a component of the vector !!  that affects performance payments but not directly the retention of internal training 
graduates. We need to identify a causal determinant of performance pay that can be 
legitimately excluded from our regression equations. The occupational position might be such 
a variable. In our dataset, occupational position is a categorical variable with five categories. 
Workers belong to either one of the following categories: (5) upper management, (4) middle 
management, (3) lower management, (2) lowest management, and (1) no management 
function. Simple correlational analysis reveals that the higher the occupational position, the 
more likely it is that workers receive performance pay. The occupational position should thus 
affect the amount and incidence of performance pay.  
However, the instrument can be excluded from the outcome equation given that these young 
graduates are mostly in category (1) as they are at the beginning of their career. We thus 
assume that the occupational position can be omitted from our regression equations, since the 
direct role of occupations is adequately captured by the regressors “job requirements” and 
“occupational tasks.” 
4.2 Estimation 
The function that has to be estimated can be specified as follows:  !!" ! !!" ! !!" ! !!!" ! !!"! ! !!" ! !! ! !! ! !! ! !!"! (4) 
where t is a time indicator and j is a firm indicator, !!" is the share of internal TRAINING 
graduates, !!!" is the main explanatory variable, performance pay intensity in model I and 
performance pay coverage in model II. !!"!  is a vector of control variables, and !! ! !!!! !! are 
controls for region, industry, and year. !!" is the error term, which is assumed to be mean zero 
and normally distributed. We call this function the “graduates equation.” The control vector !!"!  includes wages, age and tenure and their squared terms, a job requirements measure, an 
occupational tasks measure, gender and nationality dummies, and firm size. We include wage 
(measuring the base payments without performance pay) as control variable to ensure that our 
PP-variables are not simply capturing wage effects, i.e., it is not only the higher wage that 
induces graduates to stay.  
Because our dependent variable is bound between 0 and 1, we perform a logit transformation 
on the data (Baum 2008; Papke & Wooldridge 1996). Specifically, with our dependent 
variable y and our independent variables X, we assume that the model that best describes y is 
! ! !"#$%&!' !" !  If we then perform the logit transformation, the result is !"!!! !! ! !!! ! !"! With this transformation, we can fit the model using simple OLS. Of 
course, we cannot perform the transformation on observations where the dependent variable is 
zero or one, because the result will be a missing value. Therefore, we winsorize our data, 
replacing the highest and lowest values with 0.00001 and 0.99999 respectively (Cox 2006).  
To begin the investigation of the effect of performance pay on the retention success, we run 
pooled OLS regressions. However, with pooled OLS we consider observations of the same 
firm in different years as independent and we do not take unobserved firm heterogeneity into 
account. Therefore, this regression is potentially biased. Most firms have unobserved 
characteristics that influence both a firm’s payment strategy and the rate of internal training 
graduates. One example is a firm’s productivity level, because a higher productivity leads to 
higher performance pay rates, and at the same time to higher training endeavors. To overcome 
time invariant unobserved heterogeneity, we take advantage of the panel structure of our data 
and estimate firm fixed effects regressions.  
Equation (5) shows our second specification. The firm fixed effect, !!, captures the impact of 
time-invariant differences among firms in observed and unobserved characteristics. !!" ! !!" ! !!" ! !!!" ! !!"! ! !!" ! !! ! !! ! !!"!! "#$!
However, as argued previously, endogeneity might bias our fixed effects regressions. 
Therefore, in the third step, we apply an IV approach and use the occupational positions as an 
instrument for performance pay. We estimate the following two-equation system with 2SLS: 
First stage: !!!" ! !!!" ! !!" ! !"!" ! !!"! ! !!" ! !! ! !! ! !!"%! "&$!
Second stage: !!" ! !!" ! !!" ! !!!" ! !!"! ! !!" ! !! ! !! ! !!"'! "($!
 
5. Results 
Tables 2 and 3 report the results of the pooled OLS with clustered standard errors for model I 
and model II respectively. In specification (1), we regress the retention variable on our 
performance pay measures without including any controls. In specification (2), we estimate 
the full model with all controls. The results show that both the performance pay intensity (PP-
intensity) and the performance pay coverage (PP-coverage) have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the rate of internal training graduates.  
To interpret the effect size, we need to keep in mind that our dependent variable and our main 
explanatory variables are proportions. The coefficients of these variables can be interpreted in 
terms of a percentage change in the rate of internal training graduates. In the full model, a ten 
percent increase in PP-intensity increases the rate of internal training graduates by 
0.12 percent. Similarly, a ten percent increase in PP-coverage increases the rate of internal 
training graduates by 0.072 percent. At first glance, this effect may seem economically 
unimportant. However, recall that in our sample with conservative measurements the mean 
rate of internal training graduates is 0.44 percent. A ten percent increase in our PP-measures 
thus increases the rate of internal training graduates from 0.44 percent to about 
0.4405 percent. With a ten percent increase in PP-intensity or PP-coverage, the number of 
internal training graduates thus increases from 4.4 to 4.5 workers per 1000 VET workers. 
Since the true rate is potentially larger, so is the true effect size. Indeed, in our robustness 
checks, where we include all internal training graduates and not only the young ones, the 
effect sizes are three times larger (see Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2).  
The control variables comprise individual and firm characteristics aggregated at the firm 
level. Size and direction of the coefficients are similar in both models. Average wages have a 
small, but significantly positive effect on the rate of internal training graduates. The variable 
age is U-shaped and tenure is inverted U-shaped and both are highly statistically significant. 
Both effects are in line with our expectations and result from our definition of internal 
training graduates. Since we impose the restriction that the graduates cannot be older than 21 
years, age has a negative effect on the rate of internal training graduates with a minimum at 
around 46 years. Similarly, increasing tenure has a positive effect on the rate of internal 
training graduates with a maximum at 16 years of tenure.  
As expected, the variable “job requirements” has a significantly positive effect of the rate of 
internal training graduates. With increasingly demanding tasks, the rate of internal training 
graduates increases. This makes sense both from the firm’s and the graduates’ perspectives. 
Firms are eager to retain graduates who fulfill tasks that are not easily replaceable and 
graduates will be more inclined to stay if they have meaningful job tasks. Surprisingly, the 
percentage of males has a significantly negative effect of the rate of internal training 
graduates. It appears that the higher the percentage of male workers, the lower the probability 
that graduates stay with their firm. One could derive from this result that firms should make 
sure to have a gender-balanced workforce to retain their graduates.  
 
{Tables 2 and 3 here} 
 
As discussed earlier, pooled OLS regressions are potentially biased and might lead us to draw 
wrong conclusions. Exploiting the panel structure of our data, in the next step, we estimate 
firm-fixed effects to overcome this bias and improve our estimation results. Tables 4 and 5 
report the results for the firm fixed-effects regressions with cluster-robust standard errors for 
model I and model II respectively. Again, we first regress our dependent variable on the 
performance pay measures alone and then include the control variables. 
Overall, we confirm the results obtained in the pooled OLS regressions. Again, we find that 
both performance pay measures are highly significantly positively correlated with the share of 
internal training graduates. In the full model in specification (2), a ten percent increase in PP-
intensity or PP-coverage increases the rate of internal training graduates by about 0.1 percent 
(0.145 and 0.111 percent respectively). This effect size is largely in line with the effect sizes 
from the pooled OLS regressions.  
Again, average wages have a small but highly statistically significant positive effect on the 
rate of internal training graduates. Age and tenure effects are similar to the OLS estimates in 
terms of significance and magnitude. In the FE estimates, gender and job requirements do not 
have significant effects anymore. 
Given that also the results from the fixed-effects regressions might be biased, we present a 
detailed discussion and interpretation of the effect sizes in our instrumental variables 
regressions in Tables 6 and 7. 
 
{Tables 4 and 5 here} 
 
Despite their stability across specifications, the estimated performance pay coefficients in 
Tables 4 and 5 may give a biased estimate of the true economic effect because of potential 
endogeneity. It is conceivable that firms alter their qualification structure simultaneously with 
their profit or that both are influenced by demand shocks. A convincing analysis of the causal 
effect of performance pay on the rate of internal training graduates requires an exogenous 
source of variation in the performance pay measures. We need to identify a causal 
determinant of performance pay that can be excluded from our graduates function. We use the 
occupational position (OP) as an exogenous determinant of performance pay. Workers who 
hold managerial positions are both more likely to receive performance pay and receive a 
higher share of performance pay than workers who hold no managerial positions. Given that 
young training graduates who are just starting their career do generally not hold managerial 
positions, one can expect OP to have no influence on the rate of internal training graduates.  
Tables 6 and 7 present the results from our IV regressions, using OP as an instrument. To 
investigate the relation between the instrument and the dependent variable, we first run the 
reduced form regression. The reduced form coefficients show that the instrument is highly 
statistically significant and positively correlated with the dependent variable. The coefficient 
is rather small, however, it is similar in size to the coefficients of the control variables. These 
results support the credibility of our instrument.  
In our 2SLS regression, the first stage regression has high explanatory power and the OP 
coefficient is positive and highly statistically significant. Because we have one instrument for 
one endogenous variable, we cannot test for instrument validity. However, the first stage tests 
for instrument relevance. The value of the F-statistic of the first stage is well above 10 in both 
models (105.40 in model I and 213.55 in model II), so that we can confidently assume that 
our instrument is strong (Staiger & Stock 1997). As an additional test for weak instruments, 
Stock & Yogo (2005) propose a test for the just-identified case. If we are willing to tolerate 
distortion for a 5% Wald test based on the 2SLS estimator so that the true size can be at most 
10 percent, then we reject the null hypothesis if the test statistic exceeds 16.38. The F-statistic 
greatly exceeds this value so that we feel comfortable in rejecting the null of weak 
instruments. 
The second stage results show a highly statistically significant positive effect of performance 
pay on the retention of training graduates. The use of occupational position as an exogenous 
determinant of performance pay yields IV estimates of the performance pay effect of 
3.86 percent for PP-intensity and 2.34 percent for PP-coverage. The 2SLS estimates are about 
two times larger than the corresponding OLS estimates. The standard errors of the IV 
estimates are obviously larger than the OLS estimates, but overall not inflated to a worrisome 
size. The effect of PP-intensity is almost two times larger that the effect of PP-coverage. This 
makes sense assuming that the decision-making would be driven more by the extra amount of 
money that an individual receives rather than by the likelihood that a person receives an extra 
amount of money.  
Among the control variables, again, wages, age and tenure are significant in the second stage 
for both models. Aside from the likelihood of receiving performance pay, also the base pay 
received matters to training graduates. As we have pointed out previously, this is in line with 
expectations. The most productive training graduates decide to stay with their firm not only if 
they have a high chance of receiving performance pay, but, of course, also only if the base 
pay is attractive enough. 
Overall, the results support our hypothesis. In terms of effect size, a 10 percent increase in 
PP-intensity causes an increase of 0.38 percent in the rate of internal training graduates. A 
10 percent increase in PP-coverage causes an increase of 0.23 percent in the rate of internal 
training graduates. These effects are sizable given that our rate of internal training graduates 
is 0.04 percent only. Because we are able to take into account both unobserved heterogeneity 
and endogeneity, the panel IV regression is our preferred estimation specification. Our results 
show a causal relationship between performance pay and the internal rate of training 
graduates, thus that a performance pay effect exists that influences a firm’s ability to retain 
graduates.  
 
{Tables 6 and 7 here} 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect of performance pay on the retention of internal training 
graduates. Being able to retain these graduates is crucial for a firm’s willingness to offer and 
pay for general training, because it allows firms to realize a return on their educational 
investments. Previous studies explain a firm’s training incentive with the existence of 
imperfect labor markets, identifying different market frictions and institutions that induce a 
training investment. Our explanation does not rely on labor market conditions. Instead, we 
explore what firms themselves might do. Applying findings from personnel economics to the 
theory of training, we hypothesize that training firms use performance pay to incentivize their 
most productive graduates to stay. Drawing on a theoretical model by Lazear (1986), we 
develop a simple contracting framework to provide a rationale for this firm behavior.  
In the empirical analysis, we use data from a representative employer-employee survey that 
contains register data on the base pay and performance pay (PP) of individual workers. We 
construct two different PP-measures, one reflecting the share of performance pay relative to 
the base pay and the other the share of workers receiving performance pay. To establish a 
credible causal link between our PP-measures and a firm’s ability to retain graduates we use 
instrumental variable regression. As instrument, we use a variable measuring the occupational 
position of workers, arguing that the position should be correlated with performance pay but 
should not have any effect on the retention of graduates.  
We find that training firms with PP have a significantly higher retention of internal training 
graduates than training firms with fixed salary pay. We are able to consistently show a causal 
relationship between the use of PP and the internal rate of training graduates and thus argue 
that there exists a performance pay effect that influences a firm’s ability to retain graduates. 
We contribute to the theory of training by providing an additional answer to the question of 
why firms provide and pay for training even if that training is general and easily marketable. 
This paper thus provides additional insights into the question of why firms offer and pay for 
general training. Finally, because retaining the most productive graduates helps covering a 
firm’s training costs, an increased retention rate should in turn lead to a higher likelihood of 
offering training.  
 
 
  
Tables 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics  
    Variables Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Internal training graduates 16,718 0.0044 0.0188 0.0008 0.333 
PP-intensity 16,718 0.0970 0.165 0 0.936 
PP-coverage 16,718 0.102 0.189 0 1 
Wage 16,718 6,270 2,242 1,735 52,526 
Occupational tasks 16,718 20.89 7.742 10 40 
Occupational position 16,718 3.855 1.023 1 5 
Job requirements 16,718 2.233 0.725 1 4 
Tenure 16,718 10.18 5.459 0 48 
Age 16,718 41.08 5.851 18 64 
Male 16,718 0.752 0.270 0 1 
Swiss 16,718 0.602 0.322 0 1 
Firm size 16,718 180.9 691.2 5 32,000 
Industry 16,718 7.081 3.286 3 15 
Region 16,718 3.632 1.858 1 7 
Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, 1998-2004. Based on authors’ calculations. 
 
  
Table 2. Model I: Pooled OLS estimates, dependent variable: rate of internal training graduates 
 (1) (2) 
PP-intensity 0.0372*** 0.0120*** 
 (0.0017) (0.00171) 
Wage  0.000002*** 
  (0.0000001) 
Age  -0.0031*** 
  (0.0003) 
Age squared  0.00003*** 
  (0.000003) 
Tenure  0.0006*** 
  (0.00009) 
Tenure squared  -0.00002*** 
  (0.000003) 
Male  -0.0014** 
  (0.0006) 
Swiss  0.0003 
  (0.0004) 
Occupational tasks  -0.000003 
  (0.00002) 
Job requirements  0.0007*** 
  (0.0002) 
Firm size No Yes 
Industry No Yes 
Region No Yes 
Year No Yes 
R-squared 0.1067 0.173 
N 16,718 16,718 
Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, authors’ calculations. 
Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 3. Model II: Pooled OLS estimates, dependent variable: rate of internal training 
graduates 
 (1) (2) 
PP-coverage 0.0286*** 0.0072*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Wage  0.000002*** 
  (0.0000001) 
Age  -0.0032*** 
  (0.0003) 
Age squared  0.00003*** 
  (0.000003) 
Tenure  0.0006*** 
  (0.00009) 
Tenure squared  -0.00002*** 
  (0.000003) 
Male  -0.0017*** 
  (0.0007) 
Swiss  0.0005 
  (0.0004) 
Occupational tasks  0.000002 
  (0.00002) 
Job requirements  0.0007*** 
  (0.0002) 
Firm size No Yes 
Industry No Yes 
Region No Yes 
Year No Yes 
R-squared 0.0831 0.171 
N 16,718 16,718 
Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, authors’ calculations. 
Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
  
Table 4. Model I: Fixed effects estimates, dependent variable: rate of internal training graduates 
 (1) (2) 
PP-intensity 0.0357*** 0.0145*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Wage  0.000002*** 
  (0.0000001) 
Age  -0.0029*** 
  (0.0004) 
Age squared  0.00003*** 
  (0.000005) 
Tenure  0.0004** 
  (0.0002) 
Tenure squared  -0.00001*** 
  (0.000005) 
Male  0.0008 
  (0.0014) 
Swiss  -0.0002 
  (0.0009) 
Job requirements  0.00003 
  (0.00004) 
Occupational tasks  -0.0004 
  (0.0004) 
Firm size No Yes 
Industry No Yes 
Region No Yes 
Year No Yes 
R-squared 0.0565 0.111 
N 16,718 16,718 
Number of firms 6,897 6,897 
Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, authors’ calculations. 
Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
  
Table 5. Model II: Fixed effects estimates, dependent variable: rate of internal training 
graduates 
 (1) (2) 
PP-coverage 0.0279*** 0.0111*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0023) 
Wage  0.000002*** 
  (0.0000001) 
Age  -0.0028*** 
  (0.0004) 
Age squared  0.00003*** 
  (0.000005) 
Tenure  0.0005*** 
  (0.0002) 
Tenure squared  -0.00001*** 
  (0.000005) 
Male  0.0007 
  (0.0014) 
Swiss  -0.0001 
  (0.0009) 
Occupational tasks  0.00004 
  (0.00004) 
Job requirements  -0.0003 
  (0.0004) 
Firm size No Yes 
Industry No Yes 
Region No Yes 
Year No Yes 
R-squared 0.0462 0.109 
N 16,718 16,718 
Number of firms 6,897 6,897 
Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, authors’ calculations. 
Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
  
Table 6. Model I: IV estimates, instrument: occupational position 
Variables Reduced Form  First Stage Second Stage  
 
Dep. Var. rate of 
internal graduates Dep. Var. PP-int 
Dep. Var. rate of 
internal graduates 
PP-intensity   0.0386*** 
   (0.0139) 
Wage 0.000002*** 0.00003*** 0.000001*** 
 (0.0000001) (0.0000008) (0.0000004) 
Age -0.0029*** -0.0105*** -0.0026*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0022) (0.0004) 
Age squared 0.00003*** 0.00009*** 0.00003*** 
 (0.000005) (0.00003) (0.000004) 
Tenure 0.0005*** 0.0051*** 0.0003* 
 (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0002) 
Tenure squared -0.00001*** -0.00007** -0.00001** 
 (0.000005) (0.00003) (0.000005) 
Male 0.0008 -0.0176** 0.0015 
 (0.0015) (0.0088) (0.0015) 
Swiss 0.0014 0.0900*** -0.0021 
 (0.0009) (0.0077) (0.0014) 
Occupational tasks 0.00004 0.00003 0.00004 
 (0.00004) (0.0003) (0.00004) 
Job requirements 0.0002 0.0086** -0.00008 
 (0.0005) (0.0032) (0.0004) 
Occupational position 0.0009*** 0.0249***  
 (0.0004) (0.0024)  
Firm size category Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,718 16,718 16,718 
Number of firms 6,897 6,897 6,897 
(Centered) R squared 0.105 0.323 0.093 
F-Statistic first stage 105.40 105.40 105.40 
Stock-Yogo critical value 16.68 16.38 16.38 
Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, authors’ calculations. 
Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Table 7. Model II: IV estimates, instrument: occupational position 
Variables Reduced Form  First Stage Second Stage  
 
Dep. Var. rate of 
internal graduates Dep. Var. PP-cov 
Dep. Var. rate of 
internal graduates 
PP-coverage   0.0234*** 
   (0.00831) 
Wage 0.000002*** 0.00003*** 0.000002*** 
 (0.0000001) (0.0000009) (0.0000002) 
Age -0.0029*** -0.0155*** -0.0026*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0023) (0.0004) 
Age squared 0.00003*** 0.0001*** 0.00003*** 
 (0.000005) (0.00003) (0.000004) 
Tenure 0.0005*** 0.0026** 0.0004*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0002) 
Tenure squared -0.00001*** -0.00003 -0.00001*** 
 (0.000005) (0.00003) (0.000005) 
Male 0.0008 -0.0099 0.0010 
 (0.0015) (0.0091) (0.0014) 
Swiss 0.0014 0.1209*** -0.0014 
 (0.0009) (0.0085) (0.0013) 
Occupational tasks 0.00004 -0.0007** 0.00005 
 (0.00004) (0.0004) (0.00004) 
Job requirements 0.0002 0.0120*** -0.00003 
 (0.0005) (0.0037) (0.0004) 
Occupational position 0.0009*** 0.0413***  
 (0.0004) (0.0028)  
Firm size category Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,718 16,718 16,718 
Number of firms 6,897 6,897 6,897 
(Centered) R squared 0.105 0.264 0.103 
F-Statistic first stage 213.55 213.55 213.55 
Stock-Yogo critical value 16.68 16.38 16.38 
Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, authors’ calculations. 
Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix 
Tables A.1 and A.2 show the results for a specification where we reduce our lower bound 
from 17 to 16 and include all training graduates, regardless of their age. The formula is the 
following: !"#! ! !"#$%"! !! !"! Results are in line with our preferred estimation, reported in 
Tables 6 and 7. As expected, given our less restrictive definition of internal training 
graduates, the effect sizes for both measures of performance pay are much larger than for the 
specifications in Tables 6 and 7. 
Table A.1. Model I: IV estimates, instrument: occupational position 
Variables Reduced Form  First Stage Second Stage  
 
Dep. Var. rate of 
internal graduates Dep. Var. PP-int 
Dep. Var. rate of 
internal graduates 
PP-intensity   0.0897*** 
   
(0.0322) 
Wage 0.000007*** 0.00003*** 0.000004*** 
 (0.0000003) (0.0000008) (0.0000009) 
Age -0.0029*** -0.0105*** -0.0020*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0022) (0.0007) 
Age squared 0.00003*** 0.00009*** 0.00002** 
 (0.000009) (0.00003) (0.000009) 
Tenure 0.0009** 0.0051*** 0.0005 
 (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0004) 
Tenure squared -0.000007 -0.00007** -0.0000006 
 (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00001) 
Male 0.0003 -0.0176** 0.0018 
 (0.0031) (0.0089) (0.0031) 
Swiss 0.0033* 0.0900*** -0.0048 
 (0.0017) (0.0077) (0.0033) 
Occupational tasks -0.00003 0.00003 -0.00003 
 
(0.00009) (0.0003) (0.0001) 
Job requirements 0.0007 0.0086*** -0.00003 
 
(0.0009) (0.032) (0.0009) 
Occupational position 0.0022*** 0.0249***  
 (0.0008) (0.024)  
Firm size category Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,718 16,718 16,718 
Number of firms 6,897 6,897 6,897 
(Centered) R squared 0.185 0.323 0.158 
F-Statistic first stage 105.40 105.40 105.40 
Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, authors’ calculations. 
Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Table A.2. Model II: IV estimates, instrument: occupational position 
Variables Reduced Form  First Stage Second Stage  
 
Dep. Var. rate of 
internal graduates Dep. Var. PP-cov 
Dep. Var. rate of 
internal graduates 
PP-coverage   0.0543*** 
   
(0.0191) 
Wage 0.000007*** 0.00003*** 0.000005*** 
 
(0.0000003) (0.0000009) (0.0000006) 
Age -0.0029*** -0.0155*** -0.0021*** 
 
(0.0008) (0.0024) (0.0007) 
Age squared 0.00003*** 0.0001*** 0.00002** 
 
(0.000009) (0.00003) (0.000009) 
Tenure 0.0009** 0.0026** 0.0008* 
 
(0.0004) (0.0011) (0.0004) 
Tenure squared -0.000007 -0.00003 -0.000005 
 (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00002) 
Male 0.0003 -0.0099 0.0008 
 
(0.0031) (0.0091) (0.0029) 
Swiss 0.0033* 0.1209*** -0.0033 
 
(0.0017) (0.0085) (0.0028) 
Occupational tasks -0.00003 -0.0007** 0.000009 
 
(0.00009) (0.0004) (0.0001) 
Job requirements 0.0007 0.0120*** 0.00008 
 
(0.0009) (0.0037) (0.0008) 
Occupational position 0.0022*** 0.0413***  
 
(0.0008) (0.0028)  
Firm size category Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,718 16,718 16,718 
Number of firms 6,897 6,897 6,897 
(Centered) R squared 0.185 0.264 0.185 
F-Statistic first stage 213.55 213.55 213.55 
Notes: Swiss Earnings Structure Survey, authors’ calculations. 
Significance levels: * < 0.1; ** < 0.05; *** < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
  
Notes 
                                                
1
 Training firms follow either a substitution strategy or an investment strategy. Substitution 
firms use apprentices as cheap substitutes for unskilled or semi-skilled workers and have no 
incentive in retaining them at the end of the training period (Harhoff & Kane 1997; 
Mohrenweiser & Backes-Gellner 2010). Investment firms invest in their apprentices, incur 
higher training costs and want to retain at least some of their graduates. Our analysis focuses 
on the latter firms. 
2
 In practice, most jobs fit somewhere in between these two extremes, meaning that many 
employees receive a large proportion of their compensation as a fixed amount and some 
bonus payment depending on their output. This does not harm our model. The most important 
distinction between the two payment types is indeed whether or not there is some kind of 
variable component. 
3
 The survey guidelines instruct firms that report data on part of their employees to sort them 
by family name or social security number and to report data on every second or every third 
employee in the sorted list. 
4
 The SFSO combines information on earnings and working time to compute a standardized 
monthly wage corresponding to the earnings of an employee working 4.3 work weeks per 
month at 40 hours per week (Graf 2006). Since the SESS reports the four components 
included in the standardized monthly wage separately, simple computations allow 
decomposing it into a standardized base pay and a standardized bonus component. 
5
 The SFSO has provided us with representative data on the starting age of apprentices. In 
2012, around nine percent of first-year apprentices were 15 years old, 23 percent were 16 
years old, 38 percent were 17 years old, and 30 percent were 18 years old and older. 
6
 We cannot enlarge our inequality to 18 or more because then we might erroneously 
categorize those individuals as internal graduates who graduate from the VET program at 18 
years of age and switch firms right after graduation. 
7
 The SESS breaks earnings down into the following parts: gross earnings, social security 
contributions, extra payments (including payments made for shift work, night work, weekend 
work, and overtime), and bonus payments, the amount of performance pay. 
